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Judicial Politics and International
Investment Arbitration: Seeking an
Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes
David Schneiderman*
"You're like a judge. You're called on to decide the matter. In good
conscience, you have to be able to look at yourself and say, 'It's my
decision. I know the law and the facts exhaustively."' Marc Lalonde
Abstract
International investment arbitration has been described as a private system of
justice addressing matters of high public policy. Yet, despite the very high stakes
involved-in terms of both policy room and monetary implications-tribunal awards
are sometimes difficult to reconcile. This conflict usually is explained with reference to
the fact that these are ad hoc tribunals addressing specific disputes arising under
particular investment treaties. Not so easily explained are conflicting tribunal awards
drawing on virtually identical facts, invoking the same treaty text, where arbitrators
seemingly change their minds from one case to the next without any explanation. This
paper takes up a sequence of three tribunal awards issued against Argentina as a
result of actions taken during the meltdown of the Argentinian economy in 2001. Two
different arbitrators signed onto conflicting awards, each appearing to have changed
their minds about whether Argentina was entitled to take advantage of the defense of
necessity in the face of this economic crisis. Drawing on work in judicial politics, the
paper brings in a number of non-legal variables into the analysis-such as social
background, attitudinal behavior, strategic behavior, and institutional concerns-in
order to illuminate aspects of arbitral decision making in the investment law context. I
conclude that both strategic and institutional approaches better explain arbitral
dispositions, allowing arbitrators to act in ways inconsistent with their preferred
. Faculty of Law and Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
(david.schneiderman@utoronto.ca). I am grateful to the Georgetown University Law Center,
where I was Visiting Professor at the time of writing, to Mauricio Salcedo, Ali Ehsassi, and
Ladan Mehranvar for research assistance, to fellow panelists at the 2008 Law and Society
Association meetings in Montreal, and to Morley Gunderson and Andrew Green for helpful
advice.
1 Marc Lalonde, quoted in Julius Melnitzer, The New Peacekeepers, CANADIAN LAWYER
18, 21 (Aug. 2004).
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outcomes but also to self-correct.
Judge Posner has observed that judicial behavior "cannot be
understood in the vocabulary that judges themselves use."2 If legalism's
resources (things such as facts, text, and persuasive precedent) can be
expected to guide judicial behavior at least some of the time, it becomes
even more difficult to sustain an appeal to legalism in the international
investment context. How can one otherwise explain conflicting outcomes in
international investment arbitration awards concerning almost identical
facts, text and context? A sequence of three awards against the Republic of
Argentina (CMS, LG&E, and Enron)4-a tranche of almost fifty cases that
have been filed against Argentina to recoup losses suffered by foreign
investors after the collapse of the Argentinian peso in 2001-precipitate the
question. Two of the three tribunals, CMS and Enron, found that Argentina
could not take advantage of the defense of necessity (under the relevant
treaty or customary international law) as an excuse for failing to live up to
international obligations owed to these investors.' The third tribunal
(LG&E), held otherwise, partially excusing Argentina for its conduct until
such time as it was in a position to begin living up to its prior commitments,
some time around the election of the first President Kirchner.6
All three tribunal awards draw on virtually identical facts and invoke
the same text of a U.S.-Argentine BIT.7 In which case, it is hard to explain
why two of the arbitrators participating in these three awards8 would have
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 11 (2008).
' Id. at 42.
4 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005), IIC 65 (2005), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/CMSFinalAward.pdf [hereinafter CMS]; LG&E Energy
Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (October 3, 2006), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ARB021_LGE-Decision-on-Liability-en.pdf [hereinafter
LG&E]; and Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007), IIC 292 (2007), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Enron-Award.pdf [hereinafter Enron].
5 Waibel explains the origins of the defense of necessity as growing out of state practice
on the use of force and right of self-defense, a context which is "difficult to transpose to the
economic area." See Michael Waibel, Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS
and LG&E, 20 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 637, 641-42 (2007).
6 See infra note 40 and associated text.
7 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 103-2 (1993), available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentinaus.pdf.
8 Bishop and Luzi report that the Secretary General of ICSID sought to overlap the
personnel of tribunal members participating in the disputes against Argentina in order to




changed their minds without any further explanation (see Table 1 below).9
This paper aims to understand this divergence by drawing on work in
judicial politics, principally authored by U.S. political scientists seeking to
explain inconsistent outcomes issuing out of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Political scientists mostly remain unconvinced that the conventional modes
of judicial constraint-text, precedent, structure, and history-help to
determine judicial outcomes.o They serve as weak constraints and are poor
predictors, they argue." Instead, other variables are brought into the
analysis, such as a) social background,12 (b) attitudinal behavior, 13 (C)
strategic behavior,' and (d) institutional contexts.15 Scholars have explored
each of these domains in order to better explain judicial outcomes, which
move from agency-centered models (social background and attitudinal
behavior)16 to an increasing emphasis on structural constraints (strategic
behavior and new institutionalism)." In the following pages, I turn to a
discussion of each of these approaches, though it might be preferable to
First Lessons From Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION:
LEADING CASES FROM ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 425, 440 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005). This results in a scenario of
inconsistency not contemplated by Susan D. Franck in The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1545-46 (2005). Franck is prompted to worry about a legitimacy
crisis by reason of conflicting tribunal rulings in 2001 against the Czech Republic arising out
of identical facts (CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award
(Sept. 13, 2001), IIC 61 (2001), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-
2001PartialAward.pdf [hereinafter CME]; and Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, Ad hoc (Sept. 3, 2001), IIC 205 (2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf) [hereinafter Lauder]. In CME, initiated
by the foreign company under a Netherlands-Czech BIT, the state was held liable for the
devaluation of the investment interest. In Lauder, brought by the principal investor under a
U.S.-Czech BIT, no liability flowed from the same state action. See discussion in Thomas
Wllde, Introductory Note to SVEA Court of Appeals: Czech Republic v. CME Czech
Republic B. V., 42 I.L.M. 915, 918 (2001) (describing the results as not "unnatural").
9 It is not that the case that there are no references to earlier decisions. Schill, for one,
describes the LG&E tribunal's selective use of the CMS precedent as "objectionable." See
Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Host State's Power to Handle
Economic Crises: Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E v. Argentina, 24 J. OF INT'L
ARB. 265, 285 (2007).
10 See Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political
Science, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 1 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003); see
generally, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS (Keith Whittington, R. Daniel
Keleman & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., 2008).
1 Maveety, supra note 10.
12 See infra notes 81-109 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 110-150 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 151-185 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 186-234 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 76-145 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 146-229 and accompanying text.
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understand them, instead of in competition with each other, as
"interacting"' 8 or "interconnecting"' 9 descriptors of complex legal behavior.
Not only might these tools of analysis provide some explanation for the
conflicting outcomes in these three cases, doing so neatly underscores a
point made elsewhere: that the investment rules regime has constitution-like
features, in which case, it is helpful to draw on constitutional law analogues
for both descriptive and analytical purposes.20  There are differences, of
course, between judges and arbitrators and so one of the burdens of this
paper is to locate some of the salient differences and similarities. There is,
nevertheless, sufficient play in the joints of these models that they should
illuminate some aspects of arbitral decision making in the investment law
context. They do not, however, provide anything more than a rough guide
to behavior that is difficult to explain without further elaboration by
arbitrators themselves. This is why I turn, in the final part, to a discussion of
arbitral habitus21 to argue that the LG&E case, where the defense of
necessity was made available, likely will be looked upon as an aberration
rather than as persuasive arbitral authority.22
I turn, first, to a brief discussion of the three cases against Argentina.
For those familiar with this set of cases, I would suggest moving on to the
subsequent parts of the paper, where I take up the four approaches to the
explanation of judicial behavior in the hope that these might shed light on
1 Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide During the
Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 33 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
19 Rogers Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism," and the Future of
Public Law, 82 AM. POLL ScI. REV. 89, 103 (1988).
20 DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE 5 (2008) [hereinafter SCHNEIDERMAN], or as
Van Harten describes it, the investment treaty arbitration system is a "unique form of public
law adjudication." See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
LAW 10 (2007) [hereinafter VAN HARTEN].
21 PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 78-87 (Richard Nice trans.,
1977).
22 Two subsequent cases in the sequence, Sempra (Sempra Energy International v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007), IIC
304 (2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/SempraAward.pdf [hereinafter
Sempra]) and Continental Casualty (Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008), IlC 336 (2008), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ContinentalCasualtyAward.pdf [hereinafter Continental
Casualty]), do not fully bear out this hypothesis. In Sempra, with Vicuia as president and
Lalonde as claimant's appointee, the tribunal virtually replicated their reasons in CMS,
though the matter was, admittedly, "examined anew." Sempra at para. 346. The tribunal in
Sempra wrote, "[it] is not any more persuaded than the CMS and Enron tribunals about the
crisis justifying the operation of emergency and necessity." Id. In Continental Casualty, the
tribunal accepted Argentina's defense of necessity. Applying a more relaxed WTO/GATT-
like standard of review, the tribunal found the emergency measures taken to be "inevitable,
or unavoidable, in part indispensable" and undoubtedly having a "genuine relationship"




conflicting outcomes in the investment law context.
I. THE CASES
All three cases concern commitments made by the Argentine Republic
to licensees and other investors in the course of privatizing public enterprise
in the 1990s. 2 3 In all three cases, tariffs collected by Argentinian
subsidiaries were to be calculated in U.S. dollars, converted into pesos at
the time of billing, and adjusted periodically in accordance with the U.S.
Producer Price Index.24 Tying profits to U.S. currency might have seemed
sensible at the time given that Argentina's currency board in 1991 had fixed
the value of the peso at par with the U.S. dollar.25
Promised vast profits were stalled by the meltdown of the Argentinian
economy in 2000 precipitated, in part, by the Brazilian currency crisis. This
economic emergency-events that The Economist likened to the Great
Depression of the 1930S26-resulted in a variety of measures for societal
27
self-protection. In most cases, measures involved a temporary suspension
of prices and then a freezing of profits converted into dollars. Subsequent
to the devaluation of the peso, Argentina would no longer convert tariffs
into U.S. dollars.28
Rather than sharing in the burden of reconstruction, Michigan-based
CMS Gas filed a claim for damages under a U.S.-Argentina BIT. CMS had
participated in the wave of privatization by purchasing almost 30% of the
public company Transportada de Gas del Norte ("TGN").2 9 The license
secured by TGN guaranteed profits in U.S. dollars so that convertibility to
the peso reduced profit margins considerably.30 CMS insisted that the
government had guaranteed a rate of return on its investment via the TGN
license regardless of financial hardship to the state and its citizens.3 These
actions, the company claimed, amounted to the indirect expropriation of the
company's assets and, in addition, a failure to comply with the standard of
'fair and equitable treatment' mandated under the treaty, all of which
23 Parts of this section are drawn from SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 20, at 99-101. For a
more thorough discussion of these three cases, including Sempra, supra note 22, see Jos6
Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the
Heart of the Investment Regime, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
POLICY 379 (Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 2008/2009) [hereinafter Alvarez & Khamsi].
24 Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 23, at 388-89.
25 Law No. 23.928 of March 1991; Decree No. 2128/91.
26 Bill Emmott, A Survey of Capitalism and Democracy: Liberty's Great Advance, THE
ECONOMIST (June 28, 2003) at 4.
27 See generally Andrew Powell, Argentina's Avoidable Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad
Economics, Bad Politics, Bad Advice, BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM: 2002, at 158 (2002).
28 Id.
29 CMS, supra note 4, para. 58.
3o Id. at para. 69.
31 Id. at para. 68.
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entitled CMS to some $260 million (U.S.) in damages.32 Though the
tribunal likened the guarantees accorded to CMS as if they were a roperty
right,33 they found no indirect or regulatory expropriation here. The
tribunal unanimously found, however, a denial of fair and equitable
treatment. 35 Interpreting the clause in light of the treaty preamble-to
maintain a "stable framework for investment"-there could be little doubt
"that a stable legal and business environment is an essential element of fair
and equitable treatment" and no different from the minimum standard
required by international law.36 The operative legal framework, together
with the operating license, was in the nature of a "guarantee" that these
undertakings would bind the state far into the future.
Argentina sought to shelter its actions by reason of a state of necessity,
exceptions to investment disciplines available under both customary
international law and Article XI of the U.S.-Argentine BIT. Necessity is an
"exceptional" excuse available to a state if it is "the only means for the
State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril,"
according to Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility, which the
tribunal took as an accurate summary of customary international law. A
plea of necessity, however, will not be available where other means, even
those more costly or less convenient, are available-a formulation the
tribunal borrowed from the International Law Commission's comment on
Article 25.39 Though none are elaborated by the CMS tribunal, alternative
means presumably were available to Argentina.40 In addition, the tribunal
32 Id. at para. 464.
3 Stephan Schill, From Calvo to CMS: Burying an International Law Legacy?
Argentina's Currency Reform in the Face of Investor Protection: The ICSID Case CMS v.
Argentina, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SCHIEDSVERFAHREN/ GERMAN ARB. J. 285-292 (2005),
reprinted in 3(2) TRANSNAT'L DISPUTE MGMT, 7 (April 2006).
34 Id. at para. 263. Applying similar considerations as in Pope & Talbot (Pope & Talbot
Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Sept. 6, 2000, available at
http://ita.1aw.uvic.ca/documents/DecisionSeptember6_Pope 001 .pdf), the tribunal concluded
that the investor was still in control of its investment and the government did not manage the
day-to-day operations of the company, while the investor retained full ownership and control
of the company.
35 CMS, supra note 4, at para. 281.
36 Id. at paras. 274, 284; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador,
UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award at para. 183 (July 1, 2004), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward 001.pdf. The fair and equitable
treatment standard clause at issue in CMS, unlike the NAFTA standard, was not tied in the
BIT to the minimum standard required by customary international law.
3 CMS, supra note 4, at para. 161.
38 Id. at paras. 316-17.
3 UNITED NATIONS INT'L LAW COMM'N, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 218-30
(JAMES CRAWFORD ED., 2002).
40 CMS, supra note 4, at para. 324. Indeed, all of the tribunals can be charged with having




concluded that Argentina had "significantly contributed" to the economic
crisis and this, too, disentitled the state from relying on the customary
international law of state of necessity.41 The roots of the crisis, it suggested,
"extend both ways and include a number of domestic as well as
international dimensions."42  The policy positions taken by successive
administrations stretching back to the 1980s, reaching its "zenith in 2002,"
amounted to a significant contribution to the economic meltdown.43
Neither were events in Argentina dramatic enough to warrant
triggering Article XI of the BIT. The clause was intended to protect state
action in the event of "total economic and social collapse" rather than
merely a "severe crisis. 4  In any event, the obligation to pay would have
resumed as soon as conditions that gave rise to the emergency had
subsided.4 5 The tribunal, Schill notes, denied "any margin of appreciation
to the host state when it comes to choosing reactions to a state of
emergency."46 Where breaches resulted in "important long-term losses,"
the government's conduct justified a damage award equivalent to the fair
market value of the investment-the usual standard of compensation in the
case of a taking.4 7 The tribunal awarded CMS $132.2 million (U.S.)
together with interest.48 The company also was entitled to $2.1 million
(U.S.) upon transfer of its shares in TGN to Argentina.49
All of this seems a harsh and unnecessary outcome. Schreuer argues
that the fair and equitable principle need not require the host state "to freeze
supra note 23, at 399 and ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLuis PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT, 519 (2009). Only the tribunal in
Continental Casualty can be said to have taken up a substantive discussion of this issue.
41 CMS, supra note 4, at para. 329.
42 Id. at para. 328. Frenkel reports that the convertibility law originally was "intended to
encourage the repatriation of Argentinian capital, allowing their owners to make deposits in
dollars in domestic banks." Roberto Frenkel, Benefits and Costs of Convertibility, in
ARGENTINA IN COLLAPSE? THE AMERICAS DEBATE 43-44 (Michael Cohen & Margarita
Gutman eds., 2002) [hereinafter Frenkel]. It became, with the passage of time, "sacred
dogma not to be discussed in rational terms." Id. at 48. This was not an entirely indigenous
initiative. International financial institutions and foreign investors both encouraged and
supported the policy, giving their "seal of approval" to this "unsustainable" policy. Id. at 42.
43 CMS, supra note 4, at para. 329.
4 Id. at paras. 354-55.
45 Id. at para. 382.
46 Schill, supra note 33, at 14; Schill, supra note 9, at 281. On adopting the European
Court of Human Rights formulation of margin of appreciation in the context of determining
state of necessity, see William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment
Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded
Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 370-76 (2008)
and the critique of their proposal in Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 23.
47 CMS, supra note 4, at para. 410.
48 Id. at para. 468.
49 Id. at para. 469.
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its legal system for the investor's benefit."50 He suggests, for instance, that
"a breach of contract resulting from serious difficulties on the part of the
government to comply with its financial obligations cannot be equated with
unfair and inequitable treatment."51 As we have seen, this is not how the
CMS tribunal interpreted what Schreuer calls a "relatively imprecise"
standard. 52 The CMS ruling also rendered the necessity defense "practically
unavailable." According to Reinisch, states usually will have various
abstract means available to them in the face of grave and imminent peril,
any number of which could be viewed as not amounting to wrongful
conduct under international law.54
It might be that the harshness of the outcome in CMS was due, in part,
to the BIT 'umbrella clause,' which ensured that the license's specific terms
could be enforced via the treaty. 5 A breach of the BIT fair and equitable
treatment standard under the U.S.-Argentine BIT was identified by the
LG&E tribunal, however, on almost identical facts, referring not to a license
or contract but to the 1992 Argentine legal framework and regulations on
which the investor had relied in making the investment. 6  In a claim for
damages by Kentucky-based LG&E suffered as a result of the same
emergency measures that were taken up by the Argentinian government and
challenged by CMS, the tribunal unanimously found that "the stability of
the legal and business framework in the State party is an essential element
in the standard of what is fair and equitable treatment." 57  The LG&E
tribunal, however, accepted that Argentina could rely on the necessity
defense in Article XI of the BIT. 8 Responding to the interests of foreign
investors with measures for societal self-protection "was a legitimate way
of protecting its social and economic system."59 Applying Article 25 of the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility to
facts identical to those discussed in CMS, the tribunal found no evidence to
suggest Argentina had contributed to the crisis and that
an economic recovery package was the only means to respond to the
50 Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. OF WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 357, 374 (2005).
sI Id. at 380.
52 Id. at 364.
5 August Reinisch, Necessity in International Investment Arbitration-An Unnecessary
Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v.
Argentina, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 191, 200 (2007).
54 Id.
5 Article II (2)(c) in BIT, supra note 7.
56 LG&E, supra note 4, at paras. 132-39. The violation of these specific statutory
commitments also gave rise to an abrogation of the BIT's umbrella clause in LG&E. Id. at
para. 175.
5 Id. at para. 125.
8 Id. at para. 266.




crisis. Although there may have been a number of ways to draft the
economic recovery plan, the evidence before the Tribunal
demonstrates that an across-the-board response was necessary, and
the tariffs on public utilities had to be addressed.o
Argentina was relieved of any obligation to pay damages from the period
the crisis began, in December 2001, until the election of the first President
Kirchner on 26 April 2003 when, in the Tribunal's view, the volatility came
to an end. It is noteworthy that Judge Francisco Rezek was a member of
both the CMS (appointed by the respondent state on November 9, 2001) and
LG&E tribunals (appointed by the respondent state on 26 August 2002).62
By contrast, the Enron tribunal unanimously rejected Argentina's
necessity defense and, on virtually identical facts as in CMS, found there to
be a denial of fair and equitable treatment and awarded damages in the
amount of U.S. $106.2 million.63 Argentina failed to satisfy the "very strict
conditions" under which the defense of necessity is available under
customary international law and the U.S.-Argentina BIT.6 4 The tribunal
was not convinced that the emergency measures invoked were the "only
way for the State to safeguard an essential interest"65: "A rather sad world
comparative experience in the handling of economic crises, shows that there
are always many approaches to address and correct such critical events, and
it is difficult to justify that none of them were available in the Argentine
case."66 Argentina also was disentitled from invoking the necessity defense
as it had contributed to the conditions giving rise to the defense. Here the
tribunal concluded that "there has been a substantial contribution of the
state to the situation of necessity and that it cannot be claimed that the
burden falls entirely on exogenous factors."6 As in CMS, the tribunal paid
only lip service to the economic hardship experienced by ordinary
60 Id. at para. 257.
61 Id. at paras. 229-30. The damage award in LG&E (U.S. $57.4 million) (LG&E Energy
Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, Award at para. 109 (July 25, 2007), IIC 295 (2007),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.cal documents/LGEEnglish 006.pdf) was significantly less
than the other two cases under discussion. This, for the most part, was not a consequence of
the LG&E tribunal ruling on the availability of necessity but was a result of the investor
failing to satisfy the tribunal's heavier burden of proving future losses with "certainty." See
discussion in Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 23, at 406-07.
62 Schill observes that a significant difference between the CMS and LG&E treatments of
the necessity defense turned on the burden of proof. For the CMS tribunal, the burden of
satisfying elements of the defense rested on the host state while, in LG&E, it was upon the
claimant. While Schill applauds the more flexible application of the defense in LG&E, he
sensibly argues that the "burden of proof has to fall on the party invoking the exception." See
Schill, supra note 9, at 280.
63 Enron, supra note 4, at paras. 268, 450.
6 Id. at paras. 304, 313, 339.
65 CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at art. 25C.
66 Enron, supra note 4, at para. 308.
67 Id. at para. 312.
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Argentinians. Investors could not be expected to share in the burden of a
failed economic experiment-one that all of the claimants actively would
have endorsed. It is significant that Professor Albert Jan van den Berg was
a member of both the LG&E (appointed by the claimant on 20 June 2002)
and Enron tribunals (appointed by ICSID to replace the respondent's
appointee, H6ctor Gros Espiell on 26 May 2006).6 It also is noteworthy
that Professor Francisco Orrego Vicufia presided over both the CMS and
Enron tribunals (appointed by ICSID in the latter case). 70
Table 1
Case President Claimant's Respondent's Denial of Expro- Necessity Unan-
Appointee Appointee Fair priation Defense imous
Equitable
Treatment
CMS Francisco Marc Francisco Yes No No Yes
Orrego Lalonde Rezek
Vicuila
LG&E Tatiana B. Albert Jan Francisco Yes No Yes Yes
de Maekelt van den Rezek
Berg
Enron Francisco Pierre-Yves Albert Jan van Yes No No Yes
Orrego Tschanz den Berg
Vicufia
The CMS award ultimately was reviewed by an annulment committee
established under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID")." The Committee concluded that the
tribunal's finding that CMS could take advantage of the treaty's umbrella
clause had to be annulled because CMS had no legal "obligations" with
Argentina that could give rise to liability under this part of the treaty (CMS
was not party to the license held by TGN). 72 As liability was owed to CMS
under other treaty provisions (i.e. fair and equitable treatment) this finding
68 CMS, supra note 4, at para. 355.
69 Id. at para. 39.
70 CMS, supra note 4, at para. 11; Enron, supra note 4, at para. 12.
7' CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID, Annulment
Proceeding (Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter CMS Gas] (annulling principally on the grounds
that the tribunal "manifestly exceeded its powers" and that "the award has failed to state
reasons on which it is based" in a variety of matters), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSIDIFrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC687 En&caseld=C4; see also INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, art. 52(b), (e) (Apr.,
2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.




made no difference to the final outcome.73 The annulment committee's
other significant finding, however, could have had such an effect. They
found that the CMS tribunal made a "manifest error of law" by treating the
necessity defense in the BIT as equivalent to that available under customary
international law-among other things, the former excluded altogether
Argentinian breach of the BIT while the latter excused identified breaches
of the BIT.74 Even though the tribunal may have misapplied the necessity
defense under the treaty, the annulment committee concluded that it did not
amount to a "manifest excess of power" and grounds for annulment under
the ICSID Convention.75
It should also be mentioned that Argentina sought judicial review of an
award arising under a U.K.-Ar entina BIT on which Albert Jan van den
Berg also sat as an arbitrator. Argentina challenged Van den Berg's
appointment on the basis that his "arbitrary and abrupt change of mind
between the time of the LG&E and Enron decision, which Berg never even
tried to explain through a separate opinion" had disqualified him. 7 7 The
challenge was rejected initially by the International Court of Arbitration,
after which Van den Berg joined in a unanimous ruling against Argentina
for identical "misconduct" against the claimant, awarding damages in the
amount of $185 million.7 9 The tribunal found that, in this instance, the
treaty text implicitly precluded the defense of necessity and that, in any
event, Argentina had not met the "very restrictive conditions" that give rise
to the defense.so
II. JUDICIAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION
In this part, I turn to four different explanations for conflicting
7 Id. at paras. 85, 99.
74 Id. at paras. 130-34; see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency Exceptions: State of
Necessity and Force Majeure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 459,494-95 (Peter Muchlinski, Frederico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds. 2008); but
see Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 23, at 427-40 (arguing that the annulment committee
misinterpreted the BIT clause as being distinct from customary international law).
7 CMS Gas, supra note 71, at para. 136.
76 BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ad hoc (Dec. 24,
2007), IIC 321 (2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/BG-award_000.pdf
[hereinafter BG Group]; Luke Eric Peterson, Secret $185 Million award against Argentina
comes to light in D.C. Court, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (April 1, 2008); see also Republic
of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, UNCITRAL, U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, Case No. 08-0485 (RBW), Petition to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award at
paras. 69-78 (Mar. 21, 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/BG-
PetitiontoVacateorModifyAward.pdf [hereinafter Argentina].
7 Argentina, supra note 76, at para. 75.
78 BG Group, supra note 76, at para. 11.
7 Id. at para. 444.
80 Id. at para. 411.
393
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:383 (2010)
outcomes suggested by the judicial politics literature. This is a body of
work authored by political scientists in the United States studying judicial
outcomes on the United States Supreme Court. The first two are associated
with the behavioralist tradition in the social sciences and are largely
agency-centered: judicial outcomes are determined by (a) educational and
professional backgrounds or (b) individual attitudes (the "attitudinal
model"). The second group involves more dynamic models that bring in
structural constraints. According to this group, judicial outcomes can be
explained by (c) the strategic choice of individual judges or (d) institutional
complexes that are both enabling and constraining. It is in the context of
discussing new institutionalist approaches that I turn, lastly, to Bourdieu's
social theoretical account, which helps to situate arbitral decision making
within larger social processes.
A. The Social Background Model
Social background considerations are traceable to the work of the
early-twentieth century legal realists. Legal sociologist Eugene Ehrlich
observed that the "personal element" in the administration of justice was a
far more significant force "than . . . the principles according to which
[justice] is administered.",8 Referring to a 1916 study which showed that
92% of persons charged with intoxication were convicted in one court while
79% were dismissed in another, Haines came to the inescapable conclusion
"that justice is a personal thing, reflecting the temperament, the personality,
the education, environment, and personal traits of the magistrates."8 2 This
model suggests that it would be fruitful to examine the backgrounds of the
various arbitrators in order to get a sense of the persons who have charge of
decision making in international investment law.
Scholars operating in this terrain look to pre-appointment experiences
as constitutive of judicial make-up.8 3 Biographical factors include such
8 Eugene Ehrlich, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, in SCIENCE
OF THE LEGAL METHOD 47, 47 and 74 (Various Authors, Ernest Bruncken & Layton B.
Register trans., 1917).
82 Charles G. Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and
Economic Influences in the Decisions ofJudges, 17 U. ILL. L. REv. 96, 105 (1922).
83 See Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliations and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 843, 843-50 (1961); John R. Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the
Background of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J.
194, 199-212 (1962); Kenneth N. Vines, Federal District Court Judges and Race Relations
Cases in the South, 26 J. OF POL. 337, 337-57 (1964); S. Sidney Ulmer, Dissent Behavior
and Social Background of Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. OF POL. 580 (1970); S. Sidney
Ulmer, Social Background as Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal
Cases: 1947-1956 Terms, 17 AM. J. OF POL. SCi. 622 (1973); S. Sidney Ulmer, Are Social
Background Models Timebound?, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 957 (1986); C. Neal Tate, Personal
Attribute Models of Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
355 (1981); C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal




matters as race, gender, religion, age, education, professional experience,
and political party affiliation.84 Brudney, Schiavoni, and Merritt, for
instance, examined appellate court rulings in National Labor Relations Act
matters and code for these and other characteristics.8 ' They found that
judges "who graduated from elite colleges were significantly more likely to
support union claims than judges who lacked that experience" and that
"elected office experience, law school background, age, religion, and race"
were reliable predictors in some appellate matters.
In contrast to federal appointees in the United States, there is far less
information available to undertake social background analysis of
investment arbitrators. Work that Professor Costa has undertaken in regard
to the top ten investment arbitrators is extremely helpful here, but limited in
its scope. There are, nevertheless, some easily identifiable factors
common to most arbitrators, including the ones under consideration here.
Most are male and senior lawyers with a great deal of prior rofessional
experience, usually in the area of commercial arbitration. We can
presuppose that most arbitrators also will have a common orientation. They
will believe that developing countries require private investment, which can
only be secured by providing heightened legal protections to individual
investors.8 9 They will believe, moreover, that economic rights of the sort
protected by BITs are equivalent to human rights.90
The arbitrators in the three cases under consideration are of Chilean
(Vicufha), Canadian (Lalonde), Brazilian (Rezek), Venezuelan (Maekelt),
Dutch (Van den Berg), and Swiss (Tschanz) nationality (more details are
provided in "Appendix A," on which this summary draws). All attended
elite law schools in their own countries and prestigious finishing schools
84 Maveety, supra note 10, at 10 (describing "group interests, social background
orientations, and ideological preferences" as relevant independent variables).
ss James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward
Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1675 (1999).
86 Id. at 1681.
8 Jos6 Augusto Fontoura Costa, International Investment Arbitrators-A Duty or a
Career? (2007) (unpublished paper delivered at the International Conference on Law and
Society in the 21st Century: Joint Annual Meetings of the Law and Society Association and
Research Committee on Sociology of Law (ISA), July 25-28, 2007, Berlin, on file with
author).
88 See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1, 75-83 (2007); see also infra Appendix A and discussion
infra notes 102-105.
89 Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Changing Approaches to the Nationality of Claims in the
Context of Diplomatic Protection and International Dispute Settlement, in LIBER AMICORUM
IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA 503, 507 (Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte & Ko-Yung Tung eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Vicufia 2001]; JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 232-
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such as LSE (Vicuila), Oxford (Lalonde and Rezek), Sorbonne (Rezek),
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main (Maekelt), Rotterdam and Aix-en-
Provence (Van den Berg).
Among the six arbitrators who participated in these three decisions
under consideration, four currently are or have been university professors.
Vicufia has been a distinguished Professor of International Law at the
University of Chile since 1970.91 He is a somewhat prolific author,
delivering a course at the Hague Academy of International Law in 1986 and
the Sir Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures in 2001 .92 Rezek taught
international law at the University of Brazilia from 1971 to 1997, before
taking up a judicial appointment. He continued teaching at the Rio Branco
Institute (the official diplomatic school of Brazil) from 1976-97." Maekelt
is Professor of International Private Law at Universidad Central de
Venezuela while also a partner in her own law firm.94 Van den Berg is
Professor at Law (arbitration chair) at Erasmus University in Rotterdam and
editor of the annual Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration. 5 His book on the
New York Convention for the enforcement of arbitration awards is
considered essential reading on the topic. 9 6
Four of the six have public service experience: Vicufia served as
Chilean ambassador to Great Britain under Pinochet. 9 7 Rezek was Attorney
of the Republic before the Supreme Court of Brazil in 1972 and Deputy
Attorney-General of the Republic from 1979 to 1983, serving in the former
98
post while General Figueiredo's military government was in power.
Maekelt served as under-secretary of legal affairs at the Organization of
American States (OAS) (1978-84), and consultant to the ministries of
external affairs and education of the government of Venezuela (pre-
91 See Heidelberg Center for Latin America website, http://www.heidelberg-center.uni-
hd.de/english/cvorrego.html.
92 Francisco Orrego Vicufia, La zone 6conomique exclusive: rigime et nature juridique
dans le droit international, 199 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1986) (containing a published outline
of the course Vicufia taught while at the Hague Academy).
9 See Francisco Rezek, Sociedade de Advogados website,
http://www.franciscorezek.com.br/.
94 See Tatiana B. De Maekelt website,
http://www.zur2.com/objetivos/leydip1/tatiana.htm.
9 See United Nations Treaty Collection website,
http://www.untreaty. un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/notewriters/van-den-berg.pdf
96 ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION (1981).
9 See Heidelberg Center for Latin America website, supra note 91. On the complicity of
lawyers in Pinochet's Chile, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO
TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 144-45, 227 (University of Chicago Press 2002); LISA
HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM
CHILE (2007).




Chavez).99 Lalonde had an impressive career in the Canadian federal
government, elected as Member of Parliament and serving as Minister of
Justice and Minister of Finance, among other portfolios, in the
administration of Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau. 00 Only Rezek has served
as a judge in a national court system. He is a former Justice of the Supreme
Court of Brazil and former member of the International Court of Justice.'01
Most will have had a background in international commercial
arbitration, the "generally accepted private legal process applicable to
transnational business disputes." 02 The perceived reputation of arbitrators
within the arbitration community "plays a large role" in determining
appointment.103  What might be considered a "solid reputation" in the
community, according to the study conducted by Onyema, was established
by the "tested means" of (i) publication and (ii) "attendance at relevant
conferences, seminars, meetings and dinners."'" Considering that
investment arbitration mostly is a post-1989 phenomenon, a background in
commercial arbitration-membership in this "mafia," "club," or "elite
corps"'0o-appears to be a signifier of investment arbitration competence.
The social background indicators do not reveal much about the
inclinations of individual arbitrators.106 Marc Lalonde, for instance, who
served in some of the most important federal Canadian ministries and so
might be more favorably inclined to sympathize with Argentina's plight,
read strictly the treaty and customary rules on necessity. 07 Nor, as the data
in the next section reveals, has he found for a respondent country in any
9 Tatiana B. De Maekelt website, supra note 94.
too See Parliament of Canada,
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=729f0dd2-al00-4731-
8437-ddbdf67f4884&Language=E&Section=FederalExperience.
101 Francisco Rezek, Sociedade de Advogados website, supra note 93.
102 YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 59
(1996).
103 Thomas W. Wlde, The Specific Nature ofInvestment Arbitration, in NEW ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 43, 51 (P. Kahn & T. W. Walde eds., 2007).
10 Emilia Onyema, Empirically Determined Factors in Appointing Arbitrators in
International Commercial Arbitration, 73 ARBITRATION 199, 205 (2007).
los DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 97, at 10; M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 160 (2000); Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J.
OF INT'L ARB. 13, 19 (1997) [hereinafter Paulsson 1997].
106 This is consistent with Franck's empirical investigation of whether the development
status of presiding arbitrators made a difference to outcomes. She concludes that it does not.
See Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT'L. L.J. 435 (2009). Franck does not, however, consider the effect of arbitral
disposition or habitus in determining outcomes. See infra notes 137-63 and accompanying
text. Id. This would neutralize many of the putative distinctions between arbitrators from
the global North or South.
107 CMS, supra note 4, at paras. 315-331; Reinisch, supra note 53.
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investment arbitration on which he has sat.108 Rezek, who sat as a national
high court judge, also might be expected to be sensitive to traditional
concerns about sovereignty and the separation of powers, yet he was
inconsistent, finding for the claimant on the question of necessity in CMS
and for the state in LG&E.1 09 So there is little in social background analysis
to help explain conflicting outcomes and, in particular, the variance in
decision making in the two cases by arbitrators Rezek and Van den Berg.
This material proves to be more helpful, however, when turning to the more
contextual, institutionalist analysis in the last part of the paper.
B. The Attitudinal Model
The attitudinal model is most associated with the work of Segal and
Spaeth,"o though they credit Schubert with having originated the
methodology."'1 Drawing on a comprehensive database of U.S. Supreme
Court decision making, Segal and Spaeth argue that ideological attitudes
toward various policy outcomes drive Supreme Court decision making and
that policy preferences are aligned with the political affiliation of the
appointing president.1 12 Judicial voting behavior, it turns out, is best
explained by sincere judicial policy preferences. It follows that legal norms
and structures do not drive judicial outcomes. "Simply put," they write,
"[the late Chief Justice] Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is
extremely conservative; [Associate Justice Thurgood] Marshall voted the
way he did because he is extremely liberal."" 3
Frustrated with complaints that their work dispensed entirely with
legal norms,1 14 Segal and Spaeth undertook, in a subsequent volume, to test
whether U.S. Supreme Court justices adhered to precedent and, in
particular, whether dissenting justices later changed their voting behavior so
as to defer to earlier precedent.' "5 Would initial disagreement, they ask, be
overcome in progeny cases by respect for precedent? They show that
justices generally adhere to their earlier line of thinking and so do not
respect precedent. Though there are instances where precedential behavior
108 As of the date of writing in June 2008.
109 See CMS, supra note 4, at para. 331; LG&E, supra note 4, at para. 266.
110 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL (1993) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH 1993]; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) [hereinafter SEGAL &
SPAETH 2002].
'" SEGAL & SPAETH 1993, supra note 110, at 68; Jeffrey A. Segal, Glendon Schubert:
The Judicial Mind, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 78 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
112 Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Post-Behavioralist Approaches to
Judicial Politics, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 606 (Spring 2000).
"3 SEGAL & SPAETH 1993, supra note 110, at 32-33.
114 Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the
'Legal Model' ofJudicial Decision Making, 26 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 476 (2001).




is greater, "justices are rarely influenced by stare decisis"-"only
preferential models . .. appear to be in the right ball park." 1 6
There are many problematic assumptions associated with the
attitudinal model. 17 Among them, the assumption that U.S. Supreme Court
justices typically are bound by the force of precedent turns out not to be the
case." 8 Gillman argues that justices of the U.S. Supreme Court "are not
considered politically subordinate to their colleagues and thus under no
obligation to gravitate toward the disputed position of their colleagues."" 9
Gerhardt similarly concludes that there is "no norm that obligates justices to
defer to precedents to which they dissented." 20 Gerhardt instead proposes
a model of precedent that functions like a "golden rule"-"justices will
generally recognize the value and utility of giving to the precedents of
others the respect they would like for their preferred precedents to
receive."1 21 Any norms, such as those of a golden rule, simply are not
admissible under the attitudinal model.
It appears initially difficult to transpose the attitudinal model to the
investment tribunal context. There is no appointing president from one of
two political parties with whom we can associate a tribunal member's
attitudes. Two of three tribunal members typically are appointed, however,
by the parties and so might be expected to vote in favor of their appointing
side. Wllde admits that "party-appointees will often be selected for their
sympathy towards the appointing party and the legal concepts and
approaches that counsel expect to be supportive of the appointing party's
case and their expected ability to influence the president."l 2 2  Former
Deputy Secretary of the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Court
of Arbitration reports that, in international commercial arbitration, the
practice is that co-arbitrators decide cases in ways favorable to the party
that nominated the appointee.123 This is confirmed by other accounts: of the
21 dissents in 2001 and 31 dissents in 2002 in ICC commercial arbitration,
"' Id. at 86.
117 See Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and
Old Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES 15, 25-29 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
"' See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). As Tamanaha argues, it is federal
appellate courts that typically show a fidelity to legal, as opposed to ideological,
considerations. See his review of the evidence in Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in
Quantitative Studies ofJudging, 50 B.C.L. REv. 685, 736 (2009).
" Gillman, supra note 114, at 482.
120 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 74 (2008).
121 Id at 5.
122 Wdilde, supra note 103, at 51.
123 Jennifer Kirby, With Arbitrators, Less Can be More: Why the Conventional Wisdom
on the Benefits of Having Three Arbitrators May be Overrated, 26 J. INT'L. ARB. 337, 347
(2009) (arguing, in light of her experience at the ICC, that three-member arbitration panels
are not superior to single-member panels).
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only one did not favor the appointing party of the dissenting arbitrator.124
Empirical work on tripartite labour arbitration panels reveals that
appointees often will be expected to perform advocacy functions, 12in
addition to the performance of other functions, such as that of negotiator,
sounding board, and conduit for local context.126 The tribunal President,
however, is not expected to follow the flag, so to speak.127 The attitudinal
model does little to illuminate the direction, then, that international
investment arbitration will take in one case over another.
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, however, international investment law
has no doctrine of binding precedent.128 Rather, arbitral jurisprudence is
characterized as producing contingent outcomes issuing out of ad hoc
tribunals concerning disputes arising under specific investment treaties. 129
Nevertheless, Wllde characterizes international investment law as
sufficiently general to generate an emergent jurisprudence.130 Schreuer and
124 Jan Paulsson, Awards-and Awards, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES
III 97, 99 (2009).
125 Peter A. Veglahn, Grievance Arbitration by Arbitration Boards: A Survey of the
Parties, 42 ARB. J. 47 (1987); David C. McPhillips, The Role of the Nominee at Grievance
Arbitration, in LAB. ARB. Y.B. 45 (W. Kaplan, J. Sack & M. Gunderson eds., 1993).
126 Tom Kuttner, Is the Doctrine of Bias Compatible with the Tripartite Labour
Tribunal?, 19 ADMIN. L. REV. 81 (1986); Paulsson 1997, supra note 105, at 20.
127 Kuttner, id.
128 NAFTA, art. 1136(1) is explicit about this: an "award made by a Tribunal shall have
no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case."
There is a flourishing body of literature addressing the role of precedent in international
investment arbitration. See, e.g., Andrea Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as
Jurisprudence Constante, in INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF
THE DISCIPLINE 265 (Colin Picker, Isabella Bunn & Douglas Amer eds., 2008); Tai-Heng
Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, INVESTMENT TREATY LAW:
CURRENT ISSUES III 149 (2009), Catherine Kessedjian, To Give or Not to Give Precedential
Value to Investment Arbitration Awards?, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 43
(Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford, eds., 2009); Gabriele Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral
Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L. 357 (2007); Andr6s Rigo Sureda,
Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 830 (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch & Stephan Wittich
eds., 2009); August Reinisch, The Role of Precedent in ICSID Arbitration, AUSTRIAN ARB
Y.B. 495 (2008); Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in
THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1188 (Peter Muchlinski,
Frederico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008) [hereinafter Schreuer & Weiniger];
Special Issue on Precedent in Investment Arbitration, 5 (3) TRANSNAT'L. DiSp. MGMT.
(2008).
129 AES Corporation v Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/17,
Decision on Jurisdiction at para. 23 (April 26, 2005), IIC 04 (2005), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/AES-Argentina-Jurisdiction_001.pdf; Enron, supra note 4,
at para. 25.
130 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA),
Separate Opinion (Thomas Wilde) at para. 15 (Dec. 2005), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdSeparateOpinion.pdf [hereinafter International




Weiniger similarly claim that a "de facto practice of precedent certainly
exists" in which "individual tribunal decisions have persuasive force and
compel the respectful attention of tribunals confronted with similar
cases."l3 1 For these reasons, the Enron panel, after acknowledging the
absence of "compulsory precedent," chose to "follow the same line of
reasoning" as earlier cases confronted with an almost identical jurisdictional
question concerning the standing of minority shareholders.132 Jan Paulsson,
who has participated in nearly thirty ICSID cases as either lawyer or
arbitrator, argues that, even without a rule of precedent, there is no crisis of
unpredictability in investment law. 13 3 Rather than expecting the regime to
produce binding precedent, arbitrator's opinions should be considered "no
more or less interesting than those of commentators. What we really want
to know is the reason which they said led them to the outcome for which
they have taken personal responsibilit . That is where, we may reasonably
surmise, they exhibit particular care."1 4
Arbitrators' reputations rest partly on their skill at issuing convincing
reasons. This renders some arbitral awards "influential, others best
forgotten."l 35 Nor are conflicting outcomes unexpected as findings of fact
might differ: "That is untidy, but no catastrophe, nor indeed surprising: such
things happen when a story is told in different ways on different occasions
to different people." 36 In this way, the conflicting outcomes in the CME
and Lauder cases against Czechoslovakia can be explained away as "not at
all incompatible."
The conflicting outcomes here cannot be so easily explained. The
facts on the ground-the exigencies giving rise to the economic crisis
precipitating emergency measures-are common to all three of the cases as
is the U.S.-Argentine treaty text. Moreover, personnel overlap in the three
cases. Nor is there place in the attitudinal model for Paulsson's
explanations. Those working with the model show little interest in reasons
offered or their ability to convince. 138 All that counts is judicial voting-
131 Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note 128, at 1196.
132 Enron, supra note 4, at para. 25.
133 Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 241 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008) [hereinafter Paulsson
2008].
134 Id. at 246; see also Paulsson, supra note 124, at 104.
135 Paulsson 2008, supra note 133, at 247.
136 Id.; Accord Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 23, at 467 (arguing that there is a
surprising degree of uniformity among the published decisions issued to date and that the
regime does not face a grave legitimacy crisis because of inconsistent interpretations arising
out of the same investment agreement).
1 Paulsson 2008, supra note 133, at 247. See discussion of CME and Lauder cases
supra note 8.
138 See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & W. Michael Reisman, How Well Are Investment
Awards Reasoned?, in THE REASONS REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: CRITICAL CASE STUDIES 1 (Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William Michael
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rulings represent raw political preferences-while discussion of legal norms
turn out "only to cloak-to conceal-the motivations that cause the justices
to decide as they do." 9
In order to look for patterns of arbitral behavior suggesting reliance
exclusively on personal policy preferences, I draw here on a database of
some 81 awards as of August 2007.140 Among the cases under discussion
here, Vicufia was one of the top arbitrators, having participated in eight
awards. 14 1  Van den Berg also had a high profile and sat on seven
tribunals. 142 Lalonde sat on four tribunals, and Rezek registered on three.143
Maekelt appeared only in the LG&E case and Tschanz appeared only in the
Enron case.1" If the results in these awards are an indication that
ideological preferences drive decision making, rather than treaty text or
legal norms, then Vicufia's reputation of being pro-investor is well
deserved. In six of eight awards he found in favor of the investor.145 In two
cases he found for the respondent, but in one of those cases he was
appointed by the respondent country.146 Lalonde's record is four for four in
favor of claimants, serving as the claimant's appointee in every case.147
Rezek is three for four (in part or in full) in favor of respondents, serving as
that side's appointee in each case. 148 Only in CMS did he find fully for a
claimant. Van den Berg has the least predictable record. Of seven awards
on jurisdiction or on the merits, he has found for the respondent (in part or
in whole) on four occasions and for the claimant (in part or in whole) on
three other occasions. 149 He has been appointed by both sides and has also
been appointed presiding chair by ICSID.
The attitudinal model turns out to have little explanatory value in these
cases other than to confirm, as an empirical matter, a tilt in favor of
investors on the part of Vicufia and Lalonde and in favor of respondent
states on the part of Rezek. This hardly explains Rezek's or Van den
Reisman eds., 2009).
139 SEGAL & SPAETH 1993, supra note 110, at 1.
140 These are principally ICSID and some UNCITRAL awards available publicly online.
Many thanks to Mauricio Salcedo for developing this database. For the purposes of the
analysis that follows, I count only final awards unless the tribunal has only issued an award
on jurisdiction, in which case the jurisdictional award is counted.















C. The Strategic Model
Moving beyond raw policy preferences, the strategic account builds on
the rational choice model by understanding actors as operating strateqically
within specific institutional environments. The work of Pritchett' 1 and
Murphy laid the foundation for this genre of positivist political science.
Murphy concluded that the "complex judicial system" within which judges
function "compels a Justice who wishes to act rationally in terms of
achieving his policy goals to weigh a number of factors in addition to the
specific legal issues in individual cases."'13 Epstein and Knight describe
the strategic account as holding that: (i) social actors make choices in order
to achieve certain goals; (ii) social actors act strategically in the sense that
their choices depend on their expectations about the choices of other actors;
and (iii) these choices are structured by the institutional setting in which
they are made.154  Rather than judges expressing unvarnished policy
preferences as in the attitudinal model, the strategic account understands
that rationality is bounded by a variety of agency and institutional factors. 5 5
Goal-oriented decision making-what Posner describes as "just common
sense"l56-is a feature of rational actor modelling common in a variety of
institutional settings and so could prove fruitful in the investment
arbitration context.
This approach relies, once again, on no internal account of decision
making. Legal norms feature in this account only on the margins.'" The
emphasis here is on the agency of judicial and other actors that frame
judicial output. For instance, Epstein and Knight apply game theoretic
models to Chief Justice Marshall's famous opinion in Marbury and
conclude that Marshall's unconstrained preferences did not drive his
behavior (in which case he would have given Marbury his commission to
be justice of the peace) but that he was a strategic and "sophisticated" actor
150 It may be that with a larger sample of arbitrators, more obvious patterns of behavior
will be observed.
151 C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND
VALUES 1937-1947(1948).
152 WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT (1962); WALTER F.
MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) [hereinafter MURPHY 1964].
153 MURPHY 1964, id. at 199.
154 Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A
Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625, 626 (2000); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight &
Andrew D. Martin, The Political (Science) Context ofJudging, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783, 798
(2003) [hereinafter Epstein et al. 2003].
155 JON ELSTER, RATIONAL CHOICE (1986).
156 POSNER, supra note 2, at 29.
1s7 Epstein et al. 2003, supra note 154, at 789-90.
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aware of the executive conflict pending with President Thomas Jefferson. 58
Eskridge explains judicial outcomes in civil rights cases issuing out of the
relatively conservative Burger Court as determined by anticipated
congressional and executive reactions.'59 If the justices wished to issue
rulings as close as possible to their preferences, Eskridge maintains, they
would have to take into account the preferences of the other branches in
order to avoid congressional overrides.
There is little doubt that international investment arbitrators have acted
in a strategic fashion. The threat of review by national courts or annulment
by an ICSID committee,160 however, is not very serious. Both occur
infrequently and usually review is conducted on very narrow legal grounds
(see CMS discussion, above). Other actors, however, are within the
contemplation of arbitrators. Bryan Schwartz, for instance, admitted in S.D.
Myers that a "reasonable argument" could be made that Canada's actions in
that case were expropriatory with regard to the claimant's goodwill. 6 1 The
panel was reluctant to so find given the temporary nature of the measure
and the absence of a transfer of wealth from the claimant to the government
or a third party.162 In any event, having found there to be a denial of fair
and equitable treatment, this would have made little practical difference in
the award of damages. A finding of expropriation, on the other hand,
"might contribute to public misunderstanding and anxiety" about the
decision and the wider implications of NAFTA.163 Rather than risk this
confusion and attract public vitriol from social movement actors, Schwartz
was content to reject the expropriation claim. 1
Judge Abner Mikva, recounting his service as member of the
Loewen 1 arbitration tribunal,166 made pointed references to the strategic
role of investment arbitrators.167 After agreeing to serve on the Loewen
158 Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. & Soc.
REv. 87, 111-12 (1996); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
15 William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L. J. 331 (1991).
16o PAULSSON, supra note 89, at 229.
161 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Separate Concurring Opinion at
para. 218 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PartialAwardSeperateOpinionMyers.pdf [hereinafter S.D.
Myers].
162 Id. at paras. 220-21.
163 Id. at para. 222.
6 Id.
165 Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, ICSID (NAFTA) Case
No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Award on Merits (June 26, 2003), IIC 254 (2003), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Loewen-Award-2.pdf [hereinafter Loewen].
166 Challenging the state of Mississippi requirement that appellants post a bond in the
amount of 125% of the damages owed concerning the largest civil damages award in state
history.




tribunal by the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Mikva, a retired DC
circuit court judge, met with DOJ officials prior to the panel being
constituted.'6 8 "You know, judge," he was told by DOJ, "if we lose this
case we could lose NAFTA."'61 "Well, if you want to put pressure on me,"
Mikva replied, "then that does it." 70 NAFTA's investment chapter and
dispute resolution mechanism generated, for Mikva, an alarming breadth of
authority without the checking mechanisms provided by the U.S.
Constitution. He described himself as being "on the dissenting side of a
difficult problem." 72 His fellow panellists, Sir Anthony Mason and Lord
Mustill, were determined to find for Loewen due to fatal procedural flaws at
trial, including "appeals to local favoritism as against a foreign litigant." 73
Loewen's corporate reorganization, following bankruptcy proceedings
under the other Chapter Eleven of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, provided an
opening for all three tribunal members ultimately to reject the claim on
jurisdictional grounds.174 Reincorporating under U.S. law and assigning the
NAFTA claim to a newly formed Canadian corporation, though "owned
and controlled by an American corporation," 75 was fatal to securing the
tribunal's jurisdiction.
This remarkably honest recounting of the Loewen proceedings from
the perspective of a single arbitrator is best viewed through the lens of the
strategic model. Though advancing the position associated with the
appointing party-a hallmark of the attitudinal approach-it would seem
that Judge Mikva was not pursuing mere personal policy preferences.
Rather, it would seem that he was convinced by DOJ that finding against
the United States would generate immense heat and opposition and that this
could jeopardize the future of NAFTA and the investment rules regime,
more generally. This appeared to be, in other words, a strategic calculation
that took into account the anticipated views of other actors. We can surmise
that Mikva shared these concerns with his fellow tribunal members and that
this sort of strategic calculation may have played a role in the final result.
After all, the tribunal found Loewen's complaints to be warranted-"[w]hat
clearer case than the present could there be for the ideals of NAFTA to be
given some teeth?" they asked '7 -yet ruled against the investor.
Judiciary, Pace Law School (Dec. 6-8, 2004). I am grateful to Professor Robert Stumberg






173 Loewen, supra note 165, at para. 136.
174 Noah Rubins, Loewen v. United States: The Burial of an Investor-State Arbitration
Claim, 21 ARB. INT'L 1 (2005).
175 Loewen, supra note 165, at para. 1.
176 Id. at para. 240.
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A similar concern with Congressional and public opinion helps to
explain, I would suggest, the result in Methanex where the tribunal
narrowed the scope of NAFTA's takings rule to exclude "non-
discriminatory regulation for a public purpose" outside of specific
commitments made to an investor. 7 This is a ruling which has confounded
"most experts on the customary international law of expropriation"l7 8 but
might be explained in light of the strategic actions of arbitrators to avoid
finding liability against the United States. 7 9 Indeed, to date no investment
tribunal has found U.S. conduct to breach NAFTA's investment chapter or
any other investment treaty.
The strategic model also could help to explain the conflicting opinions
of Van den Berg. According to a report provided by Peterson, his
motivations may have had to do with institutional considerations having to
do with arbitral harmony. In the context of the BG Group case (2007),
where Van den Berg's impartiality was challenged by Argentina (discussed
above), Peterson reports that Van den Berg "informed the parties that he
takes the view that collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three-
member tribunals reach a common view as to how the case should be
resolved."o80 The empirical data supports his view-Van den Berg has not
issued dissenting reasons in any of the cases in our database (even though
commercial arbitration practice suggests otherwise).' Only when he was
president of the Thunderbird tribunal was a non-unanimous decision
reached, with arbitrator Wailde issuing lengthy dissenting reasons
expounding on the incorporation of legitimate expectations doctrine in the
fair and equitable treatment standard. So it could be that for the strategic
reason of arbitral harmony that Van den Berg joined his fellow arbitrators
on the LG&E panel in finding for Argentina on the defense of necessity and
against Argentina on this point in Enron.'83 This penchant for "dissent
aversion" is curious. As Posner observes, the phenomenon arises in
circumstances where a judge hopes for "reciprocal consideration in some
future case in which he has a strong feeling and the other judges do not." 184
Posner is describing, however, a situation where judges sit as repeat players
17 Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award on Jurisdiction
and Merits at IV.D. para. 7 (Aug. 7, 2005), IIC 167 (2005), available at
http://ita.1aw.uvic.ca/documents/MethanexFinalAward.pdf.
178 Todd J. Weiler, Methanex Corp. v. U.S.A.: Turning the Page on NAFTA Chapter
Eleven?, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 903, 918 (2005).
17 VAN HARTEN, supra note 20, at 146.
18o Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: Decrying Past "Contradictory" Rulings, Argentina
Challenges Arbitrator, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Apr. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn aprill 2008.pdf; see BG Group, supra note 76.
181 Kirby, supra note 123.
182 International Thunderbird, supra note 130, at paras. 21-58.
183 See LG&E, supra note 4, at para. 266; Enron, supra note 4, at paras. 313, 321, 341.




as part of a relatively constant bench and not on ad hoc tribunals-one-off
arbitrations-with less likelihood of repeat panel composition (although
this does occur, as the sequence of the Argentinean cases suggests) and
little reasonable expectation of reciprocity.
This version of the strategic model might also explain Judge Rezek's
behavior. He chose to join unanimous opinions in both cases, as he did in
the other available rulings in our data base. But for a single ruling on
jurisdiction, Rezek in each case joined unanimous rulings in favor of the
respondent state. If in CMS (with Vicufia as President) Rezek did not find
the necessity defense available, at the time of LG&E he concluded that it
was viable together with Van den Berg and President Maekelt. Seeing as
he has otherwise joined opinions favoring respondents, we can surmise that
his later reversal represents Rezek's preferred position. Conversely, Van
den Berg with Rezek in LG&E found the necessity defense available and
ruled otherwise in Enron (with Vicufia as President). Given his more
ambivalent record in other cases, Van den Berg's preference is not revealed
but we can surmise that strategic calculations played a role in his less than
ideal position at either time. The one constant is Vicufia, whose preferences
are clear. He did not find the necessity defense available in either of his
cases and neither did his fellow arbitrators. We can surmise that Viculia
was a powerful and determinative presence on both panels and that he
might have convinced either Rezek or Van den Berg to vote against their
preference as revealed in either of the two cases. 185 We can conclude, in
other words, that something else was going on other than law and that it
likely was strategic decision making.
D. New Institutionalism
Work associated with the new institutionalism understands decision
making as both enabled and constrained by the institutions within which
actors operate.186 Institutions, according to this account, represent not bricks
and mortar but "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior."' These
practices shape actors' conduct just as actors' give institutions shape
through their actions. This constitutive approach to decision making seeks
to overcome the duality of agency and structure by attending to the
"dialectic of meaningful actions and structural determinants." 8 In the U.S.
185 Christoph Schreuer, seeking to explain these "irreconcilable" decisions, surmises that
the "personal dynamics within a tribunal among the usually three people may also be a very
strong contributing factor towards a particular result" in Forum Panel Discussion: Precedent
in Investment Arbitration, INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUEs III 313, 321 (2009).
186 Cornell Clayton & David May, A Political Regimes Approach to the Analysis ofLegal
Decisions, 32 POLITY 233, 234 (1999).
187 Smith, supra note 19, at 91 (quoting SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN
CHANGING SOCIETIES 12 (1968)).
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Supreme Court context, this suggests that the legal structures associated
with high court judicial decision-making are not likely the result of
unconstrained judicial preferences or mere strategic calculations but are the
product of a complex ensemble of practices, expectations, and legal norms.
Not merely concerned with counting votes or imagining strategic
calculations (though the latter "can be quite illuminating"),' " the new
institutionalist orientation is interested in how political behavior is "given
shape, structure, and direction by particular institutional arrangements and
relationships." 90 Robert Dahl, for instance, who is credited with some of
the early work in the field, described Supreme Court decision making as
reflecting a dominant national consensus already existing in Congress.' 91
For these reasons, Dahl surmised,192 it was unlikely that the U.S. Supreme
Court would run ahead of the national electoral returns except in periods
where the dominant ruling alliance was in transition.
Of particular interest here are the social and political contexts in which
decision makers operate.' 93  Gillman, for instance, has done some
pioneering work around the Lochner-era Court, situating judicial decision-
making within a legal discourse of "class legislation" and a socio-economic
context of a brand of capitalism that helps to explain much that went on
under the rubric of Lochner.194 Graber's book on the pre-civil war Supreme
Court convincingly illuminates the political compromise between North and
South that was upset by President Lincoln's election and which the U.S.
Supreme Court sought to vindicate in the infamous Dred Scott case.'95 The
value of this work is its attempt to contextualize decision making within
parameters that are larger than the decision makers themselves or other
actors having power over them.
We might think about the Argentinean cases with this wider view of
personnel, practices, norms, and politics in mind. In doing so, we are no
better able to explain the particular outcomes in the three cases under
1 Howard Gillman, The New Institutionalism Part I, More and Less than Strategy:
Some Advantages to Interpretive Institutionalism in the Analysis ofJudicial Politics, 7 LAW
& COURTS 6, 7 (1996-97).
190 Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1, 5 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds.,
1999).
191 Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293 (1957). For a recent study advancing the hypothesis that
the U.S. Supreme Court "serves ruling political coalitions," see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789-2008 IX (2009).
192 Dahl, supra note 191, at 293.
193 Gillman, supra note 114, at 490-91.
194 HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 241 (1993).





consideration; rather, we might better understand the LG&E case as
aberrant. It is useful at this point to return to Judge Mikva's account of the
Loewen proceedings. He described President Mason's and Lord Mustill's
agitated reactions to the Mississippi court proceedings in this way: a
"wrong had been committed that had to be righted."' 9 He described his
fellow tribunal members as anticipating not only the reactions of the parties
to the dispute but the reactions of the principal audience for international
investment arbitration, "an amorphous constituency of international law
specialists, experts."' 97 "My colleagues," Mikva recounted, "told me that
'so and so would think this dreadful' or 'another would have no
sympathy."'l 9 8 This is a constituency, Mikva admitted, which he knew
nothing about nor would have Congress, he added, when they approved
NAFTA.199 This is the small audience of international investment
lawyers-operating within the legal academy and legal practice-who serve
as commentators, arbitrators, and counsel and giving rise to apparent, if not
real, conflicts of interest.200 These are the self-styled "barons" 20' who
possess a distinct bias in favor of commercial solutions to public
problems.202 They are described by Dezalay and Garth as "a very select and
elite group of individuals" who have the "srmbolic capital acquired through
a career of public service or scholarship." 20
Though the new institutionalists mostly eschew sociological
terminology, a turn to Bourdieu's social theory is fitting in this context and
reveals the merits of such an approach to the study of international
investment arbitration. For Bourdieu, the juridical field is a "site of a
competition for monopoly of the right to determine the law."2 04 Bourdieu
here describes a struggle, fought amongst judges, lawyers, and
commentators,205 to control (or monopolize) interpretation of the legal
196 Mikva, supra note 167.
197 Id
198 id
1 Id; Adam Liptak, NAFTA Tribunals Stir U.S. Worries, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 2004, at
N20 ("'If Congress had known that there was anything like this in Nafta,' [Judge Mikva]
said, 'they would never have voted for it."').
200 Judith Levine, Dealing with Arbitrator "Issue Conflicts" in International Arbitration,
61 DIsP. RESOL. J. 60, 62 (Feb.-Apr. 2006); Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: Arbitrator
Challenges Raising Tough Questions as to Who Resolves BIT Cases, INVESTMENT TREATY
NEWS (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switzerland), Jan. 17, 2007, at 4.
201 Melnitzer, supra note 1, at 21.
202 Thomas W. Walde, Remedies and Compensation in International and Investment
Law, 2(5) TRANSNAT'L DIsPuTE MGMT. 9 (Nov. 2005).
203 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 97, at 8. Their sentence continues to say that their
symbolic capital "is translated into a substantial cash value in international arbitration."
204 Pierre Bourdieu, The Force ofthe Law: Toward a Sociology ofthe Juridical Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 817 (1987).
205 Id. at 821. Bourdieu includes "solicitors" (drawing on a distinction now abandoned in
many parts of the world) which I have substituted with "commentators." He includes
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206
text. Judicial utterances, once proffered, have a symbolic authority that is
immediately legitimate and universally recognized.207 This is a power to
both name and legitimate a certain version of reality208 that becomes
common sense for everyone else.209 Judges, for Bourdieu, possess the
symbolic capital necessary to construct their own reality.2 1  Yet the
judiciary does not have complete independence-it has (one might say)
only relative autonomy as it sits in close proximity to other power holders
by virtue of family and educational backgrounds. "Consequently,"
Bourdieu writes, "the choices which those in the legal realm must
constantly make between differing or antagonistic interests, values, and
world views are unlikely to disadvantage dominant forces."2 11
Judicial actors, then, are predisposed to act in ways that give
expression to their position and status. These dispositions produce what
Bourdieu calls "habitus" 2 12-- durable "principles which generate and
organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to
their outcomes" without being mechanically predetermined.213 There is, in
other words, a realm of freedom within habitus. Nevertheless, certain
practices are excluded, considered "unthinkable," or beyond the logic of a
particular field2 14-there is endless variability and "permanent revision" but
it can never be "too radical."215 The habitus in any field, then, need not be
entirely coherent-it can reveal contradiction and "internal division."2 16
Constancy in this field, as elsewhere, is not guaranteed but habitus makes it
more likely.
In a similar vein, the investment rules regime's structural tilt ensures
that arbitral choices will be more likely to favor investment promotion over
the interests of state parties who wish to pursue countervailing social policy
scholars as actors within this field.
206 Id. at 818, 821.
207 Id. at 828, 838.
208 PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 106, 236 (Gino Raymond &
Matthew Adamson trans., 1991).
209 David Schneiderman, Common Sense and the Charter, 45 SUP. CT. L. REv. (2d) 3
(2009).
210 Symbolic capital is a form of accumulation of honor, reputation, and power for which
"economism has no name." See BOURDIEU, supra note 21, at 171-83.
211 Bourdieu, supra note 204, at 842; Mauricio Garcia Villegas, On Pierre Bourdieu's
Legal Thought, 56-57 DROIT ET SOCIETE 57, 61 (2004).
212 BOURDIEU, supra note 21, at 214.
213 PIERRE BouRDIEu, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 53 (Richard Nice trans., 1980).
214 Id. at 54-55. This is because the "practical rationality" associated with habitus is
itself "socially structured." See Loic Wacquant, Symbolic Power in the Rule of "State
Nobility," in PIERRE BOURDIEU AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 133, 137 (Loic Wacquant ed.,
2005).
215 PIERRE BouRDIEU, PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS 161 (2000).




initiatives, though this outcome will not always be guaranteed.217 The CMS
tribunal described Argentina's BIT commitments in these investor-friendly
terms: as guaranteeing a stable and predictable environment for investments
in which changes in the direction of policy would not be condoned nor
would the defense of necessity be available except in the strictest of
circumstances.2 18 The LG&E tribunal agreed with CMS that there was a
denial of investment treaty commitments but, applying a less strict test and
placing the burden of proof on the claimant,2 9 found that the defense of
necessity was available to excuse Argentina's conduct for a period of
fifteen months.22 0 Arbitral dispositions allow some play at the joints but
nothing too radical will be permitted. The habitus occupied by arbitrators
Rezek and Van den Berg allowed them to act in ways inconsistent with
their preferred outcomes but also to self-correct.221 The world was turned
right for each of them at differing times but continues to spin on investor-
friendly axes.
Two more observations arise in this social-theoretical context. First, it
is revealing that the arbitrators discussed in this paper principally were
drawn to investment law from the world of international commercial
arbitration. "The paradigms of commercial arbitration," Wllde writes, "are
deeply ingrained in the mind of most or all participants in the investment
arbitration process.",2 22 It was there that they developed the reputational
authority-the symbolic capital-to merit appointment to the new legal
order of international investment. These arbitrators, as have so many others
operating in the investment law field, cut their teeth in the exalted
atmosphere of privatized international contractual dispute resolution,223
which has been described so evocatively by Dezalay and Garth.224  The
move to the contestable field of investment arbitration must have been a
rude awakening for many of these decision makers. Preferring to resolve
disputes according to the commercial-style with which they were
accustomed2 2 5-in camera, ad hoc, with little national judicial oversight or
217 SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 20, at 72; David Schneiderman, Transnational Legality
and the Immobilization ofLocal Agency, 2 ANN. REV. OF L. & Soc. Sci. 387, 404 (2006).
218 CMS, supra note 4, at paras. 274, 323.
219 Schill, supra note 9, at 280.
220 LG&E, supra note 4, at para. 266.
221 As Paulsson puts it, "[s]ome awards are influential, others best forgotten." See
Paulsson 2008, supra note 133, at 247.
222 Walde, supra note 103, at 54.
223 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 773 (2002).
224 See generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 97 (exploring the nationallinternational
linkages in international commercial arbitration).
225 Wilde, supra note 103, at 112; see Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes
under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 88 (2001)
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publicity,2 2 6 and "meticulously aside from the place of all the social
relations that produced the actual conflict"227-they would have found
themselves in a different political and social reality. 2 28 That this would
generate defensive posture on the part of arbitrators helps to explain the
accusatory tone and name-calling of the international investment bar in
response to threats emanating from the public sphere. The leading
investment lawyer and arbitrator Paulsson, for instance, characterizes as
"shrill voices"-"true believers" who float "propaganda," "producing much
rhetoric but less informed judgment"-those who take issue with
investment rules' operating precepts.2 29 "Dialogue is pointless; no evidence
is admissible if it does not conform to the ultimate truth," he writes. 23 0 Yet
the notables of international investment arbitration continue to maintain the
confidence of their home governments and leading determinants of public
opinion in the media. The heightened level of intemperate discourse
suggests that international investment lawyers feel real anxiety that their
symbolic authority is under threat. It also helps to explain why divergence
from dominant arbitral opinion, such as that in LG&E, occasionally will231
arise as a result of reflexive shifts of disposition.
A related matter concerns questionable arbitral claims to universality.
Here, again, Paulsson is instructive. Seeking to disarm critics of the
regime, Paulsson charges those who disparage international investment
law's order with showing a disdain for the "international rule of law."232
States all around the world-evinced by the web of over 2700 BITs-have
signed onto commitments that give expression to the international
protection of property rights.233 The regime promotes values and protects
interests understood everywhere as rising to the level of the universal.
Investment arbitration's symbolic authority is premised exactly on this
calculation: that finding a breach of investment rules (no matter how vague
and unforeseen, as in the laconic "fair and equitable treatment" standard)
gives rise to international obligations that are immediately recognizable as
universal in character. Yet this universality, as Bourdieu would put it, is
"misrecognized": "[a]s the quintessential form of legitimized discourse, the
law can exercise its specific power only to the extent that the element of
arbitrariness at the heart of its functioning (which may vary from case to
226 See VAN HARTEN, supra note 20, at 152-84.
227 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 97, at 69.
228 See David Schneiderman, Constitution or Model Treaty? Struggling over the
Interpretive Authority ofNAFTA, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 294, 311-12
(Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
229 PAULSSON, supra note 89, at 229, 233-36.
230 Id. at 236. These are among some of the more polite rejoinders one finds in the
literature.
231 BOURDIEU, supra note 215, at 160-61.
232 PAULSSON, supra note 89, at 233.




case) remains unrecognized." 2 34  Recognizing the privileged access
accruing to international arbitrators in defining that which rises to the level
of the universal is a principal task for those "shrill voices" that take issue
with this regime.
III. CONCLUSION
Having applied models developed by political scientists to explain
U.S. Supreme Court judicial outcomes, it turns out that not one of these
models fully explains conflicting outcomes concerning the defense of
necessity in the three Argentinean cases. The strategic model of behavior
turns out to have some explanatory force in so far as arbitrators may be
concerned with the anticipated reactions of other actors, including
arbitrators, state parties or public opinion, more generally. The
institutionalist account, which situates decision making within larger
contexts, suggests why investment arbitration tilts on investor-friendly axes
but can hardly explain inconsistent decision making. The institutional
approach does, however, hint at why the outcome in LG&E may remain an
outlier in international investment arbitration. These hypotheses are
unverifiable but tantalizing in their explanatory power, even if the
underlying causes for arbitral inconsistency among single tribunal members
remains somewhat mysterious.
Following Bourdieu's social theoretical approach, I have suggested
that conflicting outcomes might be explained away as the inevitable but
aberrant expressions of arbitral power. The question that remains is
whether this power will be resilient enough to develop autonomously,
following its own logic and common sense, or whether it will continue to
be challenged and threatened by voices from outside of the field so much so
that it will disrupt substantially the direction international investment law
will take in the future.
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APPENDIX A
Francisco Orrego Viculia is a Chilean national and has been a
Professor of International Law at the Universidad de Chile School of Law
since 1970 and director and then professor at the University's Institute of
International Studies since 1974.2 He is the author of numerous articles
and books on international law, investment law, and arbitrations. He is
Chair of the World Bank's administrative tribunal and Chairman of the
Chilean Academy of Social, Political and Moral Sciences. Vicufia's
professional affiliations truly are impressive-he has visited and lectured at
major institutions all over the world. In 2001 he delivered the prestigious
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures at the Cambridge Research
Centre of International Law. Professor Vicufia received his law degree from
the Universidad de Chile School of Law in 1965 and a Ph.D. (International
Law) from the London School of Economics and Political Science,
University of London.23 8 He obtained the LSE degree in 1986,239 after
having served as the Chilean ambassador to Great Britain under the military
dictatorship of Pinochet.24 0 Vicufia is considered pro-investor, and this is
borne out by the statistics discussed above.
Marc Lalonde, a Canadian national, served as the investor-side
appointee in the CMS tribunal. Lalonde had a distinguished career in
Canadian politics, having served as a Member of Parliament for eleven
years and taking up some of the most important portfolios in the 1970s and
early 1980s, including Minister of Health and Welfare, Minister of Justice,
Minister of State for Federal-Provincial relations and Minster of Finance.24 '
He joined the Montreal law firm of Stikeman, Elliott in 1984, practicing in
the area of foreign investment and international commercial arbitration,
subsequently leaving the firm in 2006242 to become a sole practitioner.24 3
Lalonde was educated at the Universith de Montreal, receiving
undergraduate and masters of law degrees in 1954 and 1955, respectively, a
master of Arts from Oxford in 1957 and D.E.S. from Ottawa in 1959.244 He
returned to Montreal to teach commercial law and economics at the
Universit6 de Montreal from 1957 to 1959. Lalonde has vast experience as
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a commercial and investment arbitrator and was ranked among the Top 10
Arbitrators in the world by the American Lawyers in 2005.24 Lalonde,
together with Yves Fortier, 246 is one of Canada's top arbitrators. 247
Canadians are viewed as "ideal neutrals," Fortier has said, by reason of
Canada's bilingual and bijural tradition.248 Lalonde has capitalized on this
appearance of neutrality.
Francisco Rezek is a Brazilian national and a former Justice of the
Supreme Court of Brazil and former member of the International Court of
Justice.249 Rezek had a teaching career at the University of Brazilia from
1971 to 1997 teaching international law and constitutional law and at the
Instituto Rio Branco (the official diplomatic school of Brazil) from 1976 to
1997. Rezek earned his LL.B and D.E.S from the Universidade Federal de
Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte), obtained a Ph.D. from l'Universit6 de
Paris-Sorbonne in the 1970s and a Diploma in Law at Oxford University in
1979 (Wolfson College). 25 0
Rezek held important political posts as well. He became Attorney of
the Republic before the Supreme Court of Brazil in 1972 and Deputy
Attorney-General of the Republic from 1979 to 1983,25 serving in the
former post while a military government was in power. We surmise that, as
a member of an exclusive caste of Brazilian diplomats and former ministry
of foreign affairs officials, Rezek has had some influence in the
development of Brazilian policy regarding the ratification of BITs (Brazil
has signed, but has not yet ratified, fourteen BITs). It also is worthy of note
that the Argentinean crisis, though precipitated by the East Asian financial
crisis of 1997, was compounded by Brazil's, Argentina's largest trading
partner, devaluation of the real in response to its own financial crisis. This
diminished export of Argentinean products, further depressing the peso.
Argentineans were flooded with Brazilian imports, creating a problem in
12the balance of payments.252 It is ironic that Rezek, as a player in Brazilian
foreign policy, would play a role in the resolution of disputes against
Argentina related to the Argentinean crisis, when many people considered
the crisis to be an act of god-the Brazilian god.253
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Tatiana Maekelt is a Venezuelan national and is a Professor of
International Private Law at Universidad Central de Venezuela and partner
in her own law firm.254 She has served as Under Secretary of legal affairs at
the Organization of American States (1978-84), and consultant to the
ministries of external affairs and education of the government of Venezuela
(pre-Chavez). She has been involved as consultant in numerous
privatization processes in Venezuela and Ecuador.255
Maekelt received her law degree in 1959 from the Universidad Central
de Venezuela and her Ph.D. in law in 1961 from Goethe University,
Frankfurt am Main, Germany and a second Ph.D. in Sciences, Law from the
Universidad Central de Venezuela in 1978. She has an active publication
record, authoring books and articles on subjects associated with private
216international, lex mercatoria, and international arbitration.
Albert Jan van den Berg is a Dutch national and a partner in the
Brussels-based law firm Hanotiau & Van den Berg (previously, he was a
partner at Freshfields).m Van den Berg is the consummate lawyer-
academic. He is Professor at Law (arbitration chair) at Erasmus Universiteit
Rotterdam and editor of the annual Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration
(Kluwers). 258 He publishes actively-his book on the New York
Convention for enforcement of arbitration awards is considered a classic in
the field.259 The book arose out of the Doctor of Laws he earned in 1981 at
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. Previously, he had been awarded a
Master of Laws from the Universiteit von Amsterdam Faculty of Lawin
1973 and a Docteur en droit from Universit6 Aix-en-Provence, writing a
thesis under the supervision of Professor Ren6 David in 1977.260 Van den
Berg's expertise is in the realm of commercial arbitration. He is one of a
number of commercial arbitrators who have successfully migrated to the
field of investment arbitration.
Pierre-Yves Tschanz is a Swiss national and a partner in the law firm
Tavernier Tschanz, a business law firm in Geneva. 2 1 Tschanz earned his
Licence en droit from the University Geneva Law School in 1975 and
served time working for White & Case in Paris and New York. He
publishes regularly in professional periodicals, largely about international
commercial arbitration matters in Switzerland.262
254 Tatiana B. De Maekelt website, supra note 94.
255 Id
256 id
257 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 96.258 d
259 See supra note 97.
260 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 96.
261 See Tavemier Tschanz, http://www.taverniertschanz.com/index.php.
262 See Tavemier Tschanz, available at http://www.taverniertschanz.com/team/pierre-
yves tschanz.php.
416
